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 Abstract 
Non-violence as a mechanism of political change has been applied with differing degrees 
of success. While such struggles have born fruit in some instances, they have faltered in 
others. Using Most Similar Systems Design, this study examines factors underpinning the 
variability in outcomes with the aim of establishing possible constant(s) that are 
necessary for a successful non-violent campaign, through the application of Schock’s 
analytical framework of  unarmed insurrections and Sharp’s theoretical requirements for 
non-violence. Aspects of comparison include: political, economic and systemic factors 
affecting apartheid South Africa and the Occupied Territories of Israel/Palestine and how 
their interplay accounted for the differential nature of their outcomes. Results reveal that 
interdependence-referring to a dynamic of being mutually responsible to and dependent 
on others in local, national, and systemic spheres was necessary but not a sufficient 
variable. It is the degree to which the interplay of the national and systemic variables was 
able to affect the cost of contention that determined policy actions of the parties. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
 
At the end of the twentieth century, a wave of non-violent  insurrections swept 
across the globe, whereby mass protests, demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, civil 
disobedience and other methods of non-violent action were implemented to promote 
political transformations around the world. The people power movement in the 
Philippines, the solidarity movement in Poland, the fall of the Berlin wall in Germany 
and the collapse of the apartheid system in South Africa captured the popular imagination 
and motivated challengers in their struggles against oppression throughout the world. Yet 
these jubilant scenes were contrasted with the brutal suppression of non-violent protests 
in Niger, Palestine, Tibet, East Timor, Burma, China and elsewhere. Is it possible to 
account for these varied outcomes? While case studies of particular struggles abound, 
there is a lack of comparative and analytical examinations on why this trajectory has 
resulted in varied outcomes in otherwise similar contexts.  This study attempted to 
address this gap by exploring the conditions that made non-violence methods relatively 
successful in certain cases while not in others. The cases selected in this study were: 
apartheid South Africa and the Occupied Territories of Israel/ Palestine. Results show a 
relationship between a state’s level of dependence or interdependence on both its national 
and international challengers and the likelihood of success or failure. However, the 
ultimate determinant of the outcomes in both cases was not interdependence per se, but 
the extent to which this affected the cost of contention, with perceived higher costs 
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yielding more concessions by imposing constraints on the parties’ options and exposing 
their vulnerabilities.  
Justification of Cases 
The choice of the above cases arises from certain distinct but shared similarities 
that are important to our analysis on the efficacy of non-violence. First, internally, both 
systems were characterized by political exclusion and economic dominance of the 
occupied subjects. Second, the struggles in both cases had armed elements that do not 
necessarily share the non-violent approach, the African National Congress (ANC) in the 
former and the Palestinian Liberation Organization in the later that were never military 
threats to the South African and Israeli regimes respectively but did have a “symbolic 
importance and boosted the morale of unarmed activists through their activities” (Schock, 
2005, p.159).  Third, in both cases, discriminatory and colonial codes formed the edifice 
of their legal infrastructure. Fourth, in both cases there was a precedence of 
national/racial origins over class issues. Indeed, Dajani (1994) notes that even though 
labor was traditionally the “vanguard” of the resistance movement in South Africa and 
became increasingly so in the Palestinian case, especially after the intifada, “the struggle 
was distinctly anti colonial in each case” (p. 102). Fifth, in both cases, methods of 
nonviolent action were taken up for pragmatic reasons rather than due to any moral 
revulsion against violence (Shock, 2005).  
 Finally, ideologically, Zionism sought a land without a people while South 
African apartheid sought a land with a people. However, the 1967 war altered the 
demographic reality of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. In contrast to the situation in the 
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1948 war, the majority of Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip did not 
flee in 1967. Israel's response to the challenges posed by the 1967 war was to foster its 
claims over the occupied land, rather than facilitate its separation from it. The Palestinian 
population continued to grow by more than (2.3%) per annum ever since creating a 
demographic problem (Farsakh, 1998). The way Israel dealt with the Palestinian 
demographic reality proved to be a key additional similarity between the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and apartheid South Africa, despite the initial differences between the 
Zionist and the South African colonial trajectories. The implication of Israeli policies was 
to lay the foundation for an apartheid system, by default if not by design. This is largely 
because Israel pursued an elaborate policy of territorial integration combined with 
societal separation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with the Israeli military government 
allowing the transfer of settlers to the Occupied Territories in contravention of the 
Geneva Convention (Geneva, 1949).  
           Externally, both cases are based within a hostile neighborhood environment in 
which they make frequent military incursions while boasting of capitalist economies that 
are heavily tied to the industrial West.  
Period 
This analysis compared two slightly distinct periods in the history of non-violence 
struggle in South Africa and Palestine. In South Africa, our period of analysis begins in 
1983, when the antiapartheid movement with the exception of the ANC armed wing, 
committed themselves to non-violent resistance (Zunes, 1999). At the same time a Mass 
Democratic Movement (MDM) was formed, which included the informal alliance of the 
ANC, Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU) and United Democratic Front 
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(UDF), made up of 700 organizations that included civil associations, trade unions, and 
churches calling for non racial democracy. Our analysis ends with the enactment of a new 
democratic constitution in 1993. 
In Palestine, our analysis concentrated on the first phase of the intifada which 
broke out in the late 1987 initially non-violent but gradually turning semi violent in the 
period preceding the Oslo Accords in 1993. The uprising comprised of various actors but 
for the purpose of this study we will concentrate on three main groupings. These 
included:  Popular Committees that dealt with specific issues such as food, health care, 
security, education and protest activities,  the Unified National Command for the 
Uprising, these contained instructions and advice for sustaining the uprising, schedules 
for strike activities, business hours, and slogans and themes, and  the last group 
composing of professors, journalists and familiar political personalities who mediated 
between the clandestine UNLU and the PLO, and the International and Israeli media. 
The modest goal of this study is to shed some light on the cross national variation 
in trajectories of non-violent struggles through the application of Schock’s framework of 
analysis as shall be discussed in this enterprise. Shock (2005) analyzes six different 
struggles for political democratization in authoritarian contexts in the last quarter of the 
last century. The central question he addresses is why and how the movements in some 
contexts like the Philippines won the democratic breakthrough they were seeking, while 
those in places like Burma were brutally squelched with no regime softening. His 
explanation takes account of state and civil society dynamics and highlights the 
importance of both structure and strategy. Building on Schock’s work that touched on six 
different struggles that included China, Burma, South Africa, Thailand and the 
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Philippines, this study tried to investigate the underlying factors in both apartheid South 
Africa and the Occupied Territories of Israel/Palestine and how these factors constrained 
or enabled the success of these protests. In particular I domestically focused on the state-
society dynamics, and systemically, at the state-international system dynamics and how 
the interplay influenced outcomes in both cases.  I view this study as a draft of an 
explanatory sketch.  I hope this study will to motivate others to undertake comparative 
analyses of the dynamics of non-violent action either by elaborating on or criticizing my 
findings with the view of improving on both theory and practice of non-violence as 
strategy for political change. 
.  
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I.2 Defining Non-violence 
Non-violent action can be defined as “conflict behavior consisting of 
unconventional acts implemented for purposive change without intentional damage to 
persons or property” (Zunes, 1999, p.138). Nonviolent actions include “strikes, boycotts, 
sit-ins, occupations, demonstrations, refusal to pay taxes, creation of alternative parallel 
institutions and other forms of civil disobedience” (p.138). Or “those methods of 
resistance and direct action without physical violence in which the members of a non-
violent group commit either acts of omission in which they refuse to perform acts which 
they usually perform and are expected by custom or required by law to perform or acts of 
commission in which they insist on performing acts which they usually do not perform, 
are not expected by custom to perform or are forbidden by law to perform. Often, these 
methods are extra constitutional” (Sharp, 1959, p. 44). 
Intifada as a Non-violent Struggle 
It is difficult from face value to conceive of intifada as a non-violent struggle. 
Many analysts expect a non-violent movement to be modeled along the US civil rights 
movement or Gandhi’s independence movement. Clearly, the intifada diverges from this 
type of non-violence due to its semi-violent nature that it later became. However, as Abu 
Nimer notes, “rather than discarding the possibility that it is a movement of non-violence, 
we need to ask whether the Gandhi-King model is the only form of nonviolent 
resistance...” (Abu Nimer, 2003, p. 139). He further opines that we can understand the 
nature of nonviolence in the uprising only if we adjust for cultural specificity and stages 
of historical development, free ourselves from the prejudgment of Palestinian actions that 
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permeates most discourses in the West and avoid imposing expectations on what 
nonviolent revolution should be (p.139).  
The basis of his argument is predicated upon Sharp’s work The Politics of Non-
violent Action (1973), which analyses principles, methods and dynamics of nonviolent 
resistance. His classification of 198 different methods on non-violent action provides the 
broad sweep of tactics that would help us understand the “multifaceted nature of 
resistance in the intifada” (Abu Nimer, 2003, p. 140). Many Palestinians for instance 
embraced civil disobedience as the primary thrust and symbol of the intifada (p. 138). 
Stone throwing at Israeli tanks in this case should be interpreted not as a deliberate act 
aimed at causing injury and damage but as symbol of their resistance and a deliberate 
restraint in the use of force, since as some of the protesters argued, they had a choice of 
more lethal weapons (p.141). However they recognized that the use of stones against 
automatic weapons is an unfair fight, and the massive Israeli retaliation against stone 
throwers would and did upset the status quo by damaging morale in the Israeli army and 
increasing public sympathy for the Palestinians; some of the key motivations in using 
non-violence (p.142). To further appreciate its nonviolent character, it is also important 
that the intifada “is seen not a sudden violent phenomenon but as a movement that grew 
out of historical experience and which represented a stage of social maturation” (p. 133). 
It is not possible to discuss the non-violence aspects of the intifada without first 
addressing the question of whether the activities carried out by Palestinians in the first 
two years of the uprising could be termed non-violent. To understand the role of non-
violence and to see what distinguishes this from a violent revolution, “one must examine 
tactics that are questionable or clearly violent” (Abu Nimer, 2003, p. 141).  One of the 
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primary activities of the intifada was stone throwing, something that was both a tact and a 
symbol. These were used in demonstrations and against Israeli soldiers “to provoke them 
into retaliation and keep them at a distance” (p.141). 
Stone throwing appears to be a violent tactic to some Palestinians as well as 
Israelis (Abu Nimer, 2003). But as one Palestinian argued, “The stones are just to tell the 
soldiers what we want.  You cannot talk to machine guns….stones are not violence” (p. 
141). This brings in an element of perception. Stone throwing is portrayed here as a 
deliberate restraint in the use of force. The argument is that the Israeli military would 
make the use of weapons counterproductive. Indeed, successful reliance on stone 
throwing had an important effect on the Palestinians’ self image. They no longer feared 
Israel’s superior weapons because they had discovered the “power of numbers, solidarity 
and non-lethal weapons” (p. 142).  
But is stone throwing really necessary?  Could Palestinians have achieved their 
objectives with absolute non-violence? This brings us to the question of pragmatism and 
utility of non-violence. Can nonviolence equally succeed in all cases or are there certain 
prerequisites for its success? As one Palestinian observed, “I wish that my people would 
use no violence. Let us all sit down in the street; let the Israelis arrest all of us. We will 
choke their jails and the world will be appalled” (Abu Nimer, 2003, p. 143). This 
assessment based on King and Gandhian nonviolence fails to take account of the different 
context of the intifada. 
First, the demands that Gandhi’s movement made and the threat it posed bear 
some resemblance to the Palestinian situation, but Gandhi had advantages that 
Palestinians lacked. He was a western educated Indian who was able and willing to speak 
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the language of Christianity, appeal to the ideals of English civilization, and thus 
command international recognition and moral standing. Second, Gandhi had distance, 
numbers and space. Britain was far away and their occupying force was small in 
comparison to the vast indigenous population. They could not control the population 
when significant numbers decided to resist. They were quite willing to fill the jails and 
keep them full (Abu Nimer, 2003).  Thirdly, the British did not perceive the movement as 
an existential threat nor did India have the same sentimental value to the British that 
Palestine has to Israel. Most importantly, the analysis of the intifada as primarily and 
intrinsically violent is fallacious in that it does not take into account the first two years in 
which strikes, boycotts, and refusal to pay taxes, demonstrations, creation of alternative 
institutions and other forms of civil disobedience formed the bulk of the resistance. 
Finally, it is important that the intifada or antiapartheid movement is not analyzed in 
monolithic terms as an organized whole. As Shock notes in Unarmed Insurrections, no 
liberation movement can be purely nonviolent (Shock, 2005). Hence incidents of 
violence in the larger group should not obscure the nonviolent character and purpose of 
the movement.    
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A study of nonviolent struggles reveals an avalanche of scholarly work on various 
frameworks which determine success or failure of non-violent struggles. Schock (2005) 
discusses these frameworks in detail some of which are highlighted in this chapter. These 
include inter alia; structural and perceived opportunities, national and international 
opportunities, violence and radical flank effects and clear and limited goals. 
Structural and perceived opportunities 
This framework assumes that there is a close connection between structural and 
perceived opportunities. Contrary to these assumptions however, there may be instances 
where structural and perceived opportunities are mismatched. Charles Kuzman argues in 
the case of Iranian revolution in 1979, there was a mismatch between the two, as 
challengers’ perceived opportunities despite the absence of objective structural 
opportunities (Kuzman, 1996). Although the Shah’s regime remained strong and its 
capacities for repression were not diminished, the challenger’s calculations about 
political opportunities and constraints were based on the growth of the opposition rather 
than on the objective strength of the state. People feared repression and the consequences 
of engaging in collective action, but they perceived that constraints on participation were 
decreasing as the challenge grew more widespread. Thus Kuzman concludes that 
perceived opportunities may affect the mobilization and outcomes of social movements 
independent of structural opportunities. In China however, the mismatch between 
perceived and structural opportunities contributed to the challenge’s demise. “Perceptions 
of structural elite divisions within the communist party gave people false hope thereby 
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encouraging their futile struggle” (Zhao, 2001, p. 320). Thus perceived elite divisions 
lowered the perceived risk of mobilization and promoted the escalation of demands. The 
result was a tragic failure (Schock, 2005). 
National and International opportunities 
The international context may influence political contention directly by shaping the 
balance of power within countries or indirectly through its impact on national political 
structures (Jenkins & Schock, 1992). The degree and nature of external influence are 
shaped by the types of a country’s interdependencies with transnational actors (Schock, 
2005) namely:  the extent to which a country is integrated with or isolated from the 
international system, the extent to which a country is dependent upon another country, the 
nature of economic relations with other countries. First, Schock (2005) is of the opinion 
that the more integrated a state is into the international system of states, the more likely it 
will be that foreign states and transnational social movements will be in a position to 
provide support for a challenge or effectively pressure a state for change. Second, states 
that are more dependent on external support are more susceptible to foreign influence in 
their domestic politics. The opposite is also true. Third, he argues that the nature of 
economic ties to the international system has consequences for political contention within 
countries. Countries whose economies are characterized by export oriented 
industrialization, for example, are more susceptible to pressures for economic and political 
liberalization than are countries whose economies are oriented toward providing natural 
resources to other countries. Apartheid South Africa with its heavy dependence on the 
capitalist West for its economic survival therefore made it susceptible to external pressures. 
Lowenberg and Kaempfers’ public choice analysis of the effects of disinvestment 
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campaigns on the politics of apartheid supports this observation (Lowenberg & Kaempfer, 
2001). 
In supporting this view, Schock (2005) comparing Burma and Thailand, two 
contiguous countries where unarmed insurrections had opposite outcomes illustrates the 
contrasting effects of three dimensions. First, he notes Burma was much less integrated 
into the international system both politically and economically than Thailand, so Burma 
was less susceptible to international pressures for political liberalization. Since 1962, 
Burma had pursued autarkic economic policies that had not only had negative 
consequences for its economic development, but had also shielded the state from 
pressures to conform to international norms and inhibited society from developing ties to 
transnational social movement organizations (Shock, 2005). 
Second, Schock (2005) adds that the historical dependence of the Thai military-
bureaucratic elite on the United States contrasts with Burma’s lack of dependence on a 
foreign country. While Thailand was supported by the US during the Cold War, Burma 
maintained a neutral position; hence foreign power influence in Burmese politics 
remained minimal. 
Third, he notes that Thailand’s, export-oriented industrialization contrasted with 
Burmese autarkic policies before 1988 and its increased role as a supplier of natural raw 
materials to other countries after 1988. Thailand’s export oriented economic growth 
during the 1980s had facilitated the development of internationally oriented capitalists 
and members of the middle classes who had developed a degree of interdependence from 
the state and supported economic and political liberalization. Prior to the 1990’s, Burma’s 
relative isolation inhibited the ability of foreign actors to influence political contention 
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within Burma. Countries that did have some leverage such as Japan which held 
substantial investments in Burma, did not exert effective pressure against the military 
regime. In the 1990s, Burma opened up its economy to investments from Malaysia, South 
Korea, Thailand and Singapore. Companies invested in timberland and oil deposits. 
These relations proved profitable for the countries and corporations involved and their 
economic interests would be threatened by a democratic Burma since environmentalists 
and indigenous people would exploitation of timberlands and relocation of people for oil 
exploration (Schock, 2005). 
Violence and radical flank effects 
  According to Schock (2005), a positive radical flank effect occurs when the 
leverage of moderate challengers is strengthened by the presence of the so called radical 
wing that has more extreme goals or incorporates violent strategies. The presence of a 
radical wing makes the moderate’s strategies or demands appear more reasonable, and a 
radical flank may create crises that are resolved to the moderates’ advantage. A negative 
radical flank occurs when activities of a radical wing undermines the leverage of 
moderates, as the existence of radicals threaten the ability of moderates to invoke third 
party support and discredits the entire movement’s activities and goals. 
In the Philippines, Schock (2005) observes that the radical flank effect did seem 
to occur as the growing armed insurgency in the countryside promoted regime defection 
and increased the willingness of the United States to break with Marcos and support the 
democratic opposition when it became apparent in late 1987 that his regime was 
collapsing. Although the New People’s Army was unable to topple the state through 
violence, it did promote a context that increased democratic opposition. In the South 
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African case however, the ANC armed attacks on state military installations and acts of 
armed propaganda had a symbolic importance and boosted the morale of anti-apartheid 
activists. Thus although the armed wing was never a significant threat to the apartheid 
regime, “it did play a significant role in promoting the mobilization of unarmed 
insurrection” (Schock, 2005, p.157)    Violence by itself was incapable of overturning the 
apartheid regime, and the anti-apartheid struggle could not have succeeded without broad 
based campaigns of nonviolent action. 
In shedding further light on the role of violence that accompanies unarmed 
insurrection, Schock (2005) compares the South African struggle and the Palestinian 
intifada 1987-90. He notes that in both cases, methods of non-violent action were taken 
up for pragmatic reasons rather than due to any moral revulsion against violence. In each 
case, there existed a separate armed wing-the ANC and the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) that were never threats to the South African and Israeli regimes, 
respectively but as demonstrated, did have a symbolic importance and boosted the morale 
of unarmed activists through their activities. 
Despite these similarities however, the outcomes of the two unarmed struggles 
differed. Schock attributes this difference to dependency relationship. He argues that the 
antiapartheid movement exploited the state’s dependence on the people to exert leverage 
whereas the intifada failed to do the same. He notes that nonviolent action was possible 
in South Africa since its proponents were able to exploit the regime’s dependence on 
black labor and upon the acceptance of political reforms by nonwhites to pressure the 
regime for political change. By contrast, the Israeli state was not dependent upon 
Palestinians in the occupied territories except for security, and the intifada failed to 
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mobilize the third party support especially from the United States that would have been 
necessary to alter the policies of the Israeli regime (Schock, 2005, p.159). Zunes and 
Lieberfeld (1999) supports Schock’s thesis by attributing the movement’s greater latitude 
for manipulation through non-violent means in the South African case to the “high degree 
of interdependence between blacks and the apartheid regime” (Zunes, 1999, p.162; 
Lieberfeld, 1999, p. 67). 
Schock (2005) posits further that the leverage of the Palestinians who worked in 
Israel was weak especially when compared to the leverage of black laborers in South 
Africa. Moreover, the leverage of Palestinian workers decreased in the late 1980s as an 
influx of Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union decreased the number of jobs 
available in Israel. Thus, “the dependence relations that were so adroitly exploited by the 
anti-apartheid movement in South Africa were absent for Palestinian” (Schock, 2005, 
p.159). And in fact, the Palestinians were to a large extent dependent on Israel for jobs, 
goods and services. Moreover, the economic base of the Palestinian society was 
underdeveloped by the Israeli occupation, and the Israelis created obstacle to prevent the 
development of indigenous sources of employment in the occupied territories. This 
limited the impact of any efforts to boycott Israeli-produced goods within the occupied 
territories since Israel was the only source of many of the basic necessities of life within 
the occupied territories. “Thus the probability that non-violence would end Israeli 
occupation and oppression was and still is unlikely to the extent that the occupied 
territories remain economically dependent on Israel and lack the indigenous economic 
base necessary to sustain such a struggle”(p.160) 
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Given these structural relations, Schock proposes that the political fates of 
unarmed insurrections such as the intifada, depend crucially upon the challengers’ ability 
to mobilize the support of third parties with leverage against the target state. One way for 
the Palestinians to increase their indirect leverage against Israel is to promote political 
divisions within Israel and cultivate support of Israeli citizens for the Palestinian cause. 
Another way is to mobilize pressure from abroad particularly from the United States 
which has a leverage to vitally affect the options open to Israel. However, the intifada 
“failed to mobilize the support of crucial third parties, such as Israeli citizens and other 
third parties” (Schock, 2005, p.161)  
Clear and limited goals 
According to Ackerman & Kruegler, one of the principles of strategic nonviolent 
conflict is “to formulate functional objectives” (Kruegler & Ackerman, 1994, p.26). That 
is, the goals of the movement should be well chosen, clearly defined and understood by 
all parties to the conflict. The goals should be compelling and vital to the interests of the 
challenging group and they should attract the widest possible support, both within society 
and externally. Ackerman &Kruegler (1994) argue that the concept of freedom is 
inspiring to millions. As an ultimate strategic objective though, it is not highly functional 
because it lacks specificity. “The legalization of independent trade unions (as in Poland in 
1980), on the other hand is the very model of a clear and functional objective” (p. 26). 
Precise goals give direction to the power activated by a movement and inhibit the 
dispersion of mobilized energies and resources. Moreover, clear goals enable a 
movement to accurately gauge the extent to which its action are bringing about the 
desired change, thus permitting an alteration in its actions if necessary.   
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All the successful movements in Thailand, South Africa, Philippines and Nepal, 
he notes, had clear goals. By contrast, the goals of the movement in China were 
ambiguous and shifting and there was no clear consensus among the students as to what 
the goals of the movement were. Goals ranged from the recognition of autonomous 
student unions to the elimination of government censorship, to ending corruption to the 
implementation of student system. However, Akerman & Kruegler (1994) add that clear 
goals by themselves do not ensure success as the pro-change movement in Burma 
illustrates. Despite having a clear goal of a return to multiparty, lack of organization as 
well as the political context limited its ability to attain its goal.   
The above are some of the arguments advanced as explanatory variables whose 
presence or absence determines a movement’s ability in realizing its objectives. The 
objective of this research is to investigate the reason for varied outcomes from what 
analytically can be considered to be similar situations. Hence, by rigorously applying 
these “models” to apartheid South Africa and the Occupied Territories in Israel/Palestine, 
this research hopes to establish the explanatory variable(s) accounting for varied 
outcomes in these two cases. 
Significance of this Research 
 As aforementioned, the goal of this study is to shed some light on the cross 
national variation in trajectories of non-violent struggles by comparatively examining 
apartheid South Africa and the Occupied Territories of Israel/ Palestine through the 
application of Schock’s “framework of analysis” above. In summary, Shock (2005) 
analyses six different struggles for political democratization in authoritarian contexts in 
the last quarter of the last century. The central question he addresses is why and how the 
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movements in some contexts like the Philippines won the democratic breakthrough they 
were seeking, while those in places like Burma were brutally squelched with no regime 
softening. His explanation takes account of state and civil society dynamics at both the 
domestic and international levels, and highlights the importance of both structure and 
strategy. Building on Schock’s works that touched on six different struggles that included 
China, Burma South Africa, Thailand and the Philippines, I intend to investigate the 
“constants” in both apartheid South Africa and the occupied territories of Israel/Palestine 
and how these constants affected the outcome in both cases. 
 The purposes for this study inter alia include: (i) establishing those factors whose 
existence is central to successful nonviolent campaigns. (ii)  Helping conflict 
practitioners understand the limits of non-violence especially in intractable conflicts 
thereby adopting appropriate intervention models in both national as well as international 
diplomacy.  (iii) Seeking a theory that account for variations in outcomes with the aim of 
improving on both theory and practice of non-violence. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY, THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Theoretical framework 
Two approaches are used in this study; the political process model and the non-
violent action model. The general purpose of these models is to provide a theoretical 
guide of both the operational milieu and the methodological parameters of nonviolence. 
Specifically, the political process model helps us understand how the type and nature of 
government (the politics) affect the dynamics of non-violence. The non-violence 
approach on the other hand sheds light on the dynamics of dependency/interdependence 
and its implications on the efficacy of nonviolence.  
The Political Process Model 
The central argument of the political process model is that activists do not choose 
goals, strategies and tactics in a vacuum. Rather, the political context conceptualized 
fairly broadly, sets the grievances around which activists mobilize, advantaging some 
claims and disadvantaging others. Furthermore, “the organization of the polity and 
positioning of various actors within it makes some strategies of influence more attractive 
and potentially efficacious than others” (Meyer, 1999, p. 82). Hence the outcome of 
activists’ choices can only be understood and evaluated by looking at the political 
context. It is important to note that political context in this study is conceptualized both in 
national and systemic terms. The political environment “provides incentives in terms of 
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“opportunities” for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectation for 
success or failure” (Morris, 2000, p. 446). 
The emphasis on the political context, that is; the way the state deals with its 
challengers at a given time is central to our understanding of movement outcomes. For 
instance, if a government appears less likely to respond to less disruptive means of 
participation, it will generally be hard to convince many people to take on the risks and 
difficulties of protesting. If government makes protest less attractive through repression, 
protest mobilization becomes less likely and may take a violent form if it occurs. This fits 
well in explaining the shift in tactics in apartheid South Africa after the Sharpeville 
massacre of 1960. The repression that followed the massacre convinced the antiapartheid 
movement against the “futility” of non-violence methods even though the resultant armed 
struggle proved to be equally futile in military terms (Zunes, 1999), even though the later 
day responsive political context are seen both as a function and consequent of non-
violence (p.140). We see the same in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip after the outbreak of the first intifada in 1987. After months of largely peaceful 
protests by Palestinians, the disproportionate use of force by the Israel military against 
their “civil resistance” convinced more radical elements like Hamas and Islamic Jihad on 
the need for alternative means of redress thereby adopting more violent means of 
resistance. 
Non-violent Approach to political change 
I borrow this model from Sharp’s “theory of power” (Martin, 1989, p.16). Drawing 
on the works of Etienne de la Boetie, and the political sociology of Max Weber, Sharp 
maintains that a government’s power over its subjects is based on their obedience and 
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cooperation. This relational view of power suggests that power is derived from sources 
within society, in contrast to a, monolithic theory of power that assumes that power is 
imposed on people by the state from above due to the state’s ability to enforce sanctions 
and apply repression. According to this school, the most important quality of any 
government without which it would not exist, must be obedience and submission of its 
subjects “obedience is the heart of political power” (Sharp, 1973, p. 16). 
Thus Sharp’s theory is based on the assumption that power of the government is 
ultimately based not on violence, but rather on obedience and cooperation. If a sufficient 
number of people disobey or do not cooperate for a sufficient amount of time therefore, 
the government will be unable to rule, regardless of its coerciveness or brutality. The 
target of nonviolent action in this case is not the pinnacle of state power or where the 
state is usually the strongest; that is, its military and security apparatuses, but rather its 
social roots. Rather than challenging the state on its own terms, that is; with violence, 
social movements implementing nonviolent action challenge the state using methods that 
are designed to operate to their advantage. This can be done by denying the regime its 
sources of support or severing the regime from its sources of support. Thus in calculating 
the chances of success in campaigns of nonviolent action, the fundamental variable is not 
the material or military strength of the state, but rather the withdrawal of public support 
from the regime (Sharp, 1973; Zunes, 1999). 
The structural condition of society namely, the nature of its dependency is therefore 
highly important in determining the general capacity of society to control its leaders 
(Sharp, 1989). This structural condition refers to the existence of various institutions. 
These are bodies in society where power is located; this could be through the civil 
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society, governmental and non-governmental agencies. Relating this theory to South 
African case, Zunes (1999) supports this in his argument that although the apartheid 
regime was extraordinarily powerful, it was fundamentally vulnerable in that it depended 
upon the submission of 80 per cent non-white majority to reinforce its power resources 
especially in the labor sector. He writes; “it is this paradoxical position of being very 
powerful but in a vulnerable situation that gave non-violence resistance its power” 
(p.138). 
3.2. Research Question/ Hypothesis/Variables and Concepts 
Research question 
What are the “constants” for success in non-violent strategy? 
Hypothesis  
The degree of interdependence between a state and its non-violent challengers is 
central to successful collective nonviolent action. 
Variables 
Independent variable 
Interdependence; defined here as a dynamic of being mutually responsible to and 
dependent on others. 
Dependent variable 
Success; defined here as an event that accomplishes its intended purpose/objective. 
Conceptualizing interdependence 
Borrowing from international politics theory, interdependence as defined in this 
research refers to “sensitivity” and “vulnerability”, “sensitivity to the extent to which one 
entity is affected by the actions of another, whereas vulnerability is the extent to which an 
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entity can insulate itself from the costly effects of events that occur elsewhere” (Keohane 
&Nye, 1977, p. 9). Interdependence therefore means mutual dependence: a condition in 
which entities are both highly sensitive and highly vulnerable to each other. The basic 
underlying idea is that interdependent entities are likely to take one another’s’ interests in 
to consideration thereby diminishing the harmful consequences and hostile outcomes that 
may result from conflicting interests. As economic and political structures become more 
intertwined, interests are increasingly affected if a peaceful solution to the conflict is not 
found. The assumption of this concept is that the higher the degree of interdependence, 
the higher the stakes and therefore the more positive the response is to non-violent 
methods. In this study, primary areas of analyzing interdependence would involve the 
economic, political and the nature of external relations.  
Conceptualizing dependency 
Dependency in this context is used to imply reliance on those aspects of society, 
social, political, or economic from which the state or the entity derives its power. For 
instance, if an entity’s legitimacy and economic sustenance is dependent upon 
cooperation and obedience of its subjects, then withdrawal of this cooperation through 
nonviolent methods would result in capitulation of the entity. This is because the power 
of the elites depends on the obedience and cooperation offered by subjects of domination. 
As Sharp notes, with a clear strategy and commitment to non cooperation success is 
likely even with the threat of sanctions, since the coercive power of the elites is limited 
(Burrows, 1996). Gandhi too (as cited in Burrows, 1996) asserts that “government of the 
people is only possible so long as they consent either consciously or unconsciously to be 
governed” (p. 87) 
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Conceptualizing success 
Success in this enterprise is used to imply the degree at which the movements 
were able to realize their stated objective(s) through the application of unarmed methods 
of political contention. For instance, pictures of peaceful protesters—including white, 
members of the clergy, and other “upstanding citizens”—broadcast on television 
worldwide lent legitimacy to anti-apartheid forces and undermined the South African 
government in a way that the armed rebellion was unable to do. As nonviolent resistance 
within the country escalated, external pressure in the form of economic sanctions and 
other solidarity tactics by the international community raised the costs of maintaining the 
apartheid system. Its 13 billion dollar annual trade with the west and thirty billion worth 
of foreign investment in the 80s was severely affected by sanctions regime (Zunes et al., 
1999).  The government would eventually agree to a negotiated settlement that paved 
way for a multiracial democracy.  
3.3. Methodology 
In this study, I used a system know as “Most Similar Systems Design” in 
comparing the two cases. In this method, a range of countries that appear to be “similar in 
as many ways as possible are chosen in order to control for concomitant variation” 
(Peters, 1998, p.37). Cases are chosen because they are “similar in most respects and 
differ on only one or a few independent variables” (Druckman, 2005, p.210). This 
method is also called “method of difference” (Van Evera, 1997, p. 57).  Here, cases with 
similar general characteristics are chosen with different values on the study variable. 
Since in this study I sought to establish effects of the study variable and not causes, I tried 
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to identify whether values correspond across the two cases with values on the variable 
that define the possible outcome. My comparative analysis involved identifying 
independent variables that differ between cases of non-violent struggles with “parallel 
characteristics” with the aim of explaining the differences in the dependent variable; in 
this case, I compared the environment of the antiapartheid movement in South Africa in 
the period after 1983 and that the first Intifada in the Occupied Territories of 
Israel/Palestine in late 1987 with the view of unearthing the variables under girding the 
different political outcomes. Aspects of my comparison comprised the economic 
substructure, the political superstructure and the nature of external relations and how 
these bear in to the individual States’ respective responses to non-violent struggles. The 
economic substructure in this study concentrated on the nature of economic relations 
between the state and its non-violent opponents both internally and internationally. 
Political superstructure is used here to denote the nature, composition and ideology of the 
government. External relations refer to a country’s international relations in economic, 
political and diplomatic spheres (Vries, 1996), as well as the movements’ relations to the 
outside world. Is it isolated or included, dependent or interdependent, powerful or weak? 
        My assumption in this study is that most aspects of economic and political structures 
are similar but not necessarily identical. For instance, there exists a mutual 
disenfranchisement of the local populations, a systematic creation of dependent 
economies in the occupied territories, an ideology of separate development based on race. 
Diplomatically, the two countries for a long time enjoyed great power backing while at 
the same time running economies that were and still are highly tied to the industrial West.  
The validity of my arguments shall be measured by the extent to which differing 
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independent variables are able or unable to account for the variability in my comparative 
study  
Data collection 
Owing to the difficulty in obtaining sufficient primary data for this kind of study 
and the time constraints, study was based largely on secondary sources. Among the 
sources, these included: published books, scholarly journal articles on conflict, 
nonviolence, social movements, apartheid, intifada, quantitative data on the different 
factors inherent in both systems, written and electronic media excerpts from interviews, 
speeches and Israeli/Palestinian and South African official sources.  
Limitations 
• Since this study is based almost entirely on secondary data, heavy reliance on 
secondary data may raise questions of representativeness, completeness and bias, 
verification, validity and integrity of the data collected. To reduce this, this 
research will employ a variety of eclectic sources.   
• This study is based on the assumption that existing theory of nonviolence is 
inadequate in explaining the cross national variations based on the information 
available to the author. 
• Only known variables are explored in this paper,  It is instructive to point out that 
often, there may exist certain intervening variables that current research may not 
have established yet since classified information such as secret elite -pacting, role 
of the military or that involving internal security apparatuses, such information is 
not always readily available in public discourse. 
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• This study approaches the state system from national and sub national levels 
without much regard to the role of idiosyncratic variables in political decision 
making. For instance, how a given leaders temperament and character may have 
influenced certain decisions.   
• The variations in periods of this analysis may affect the comparative quality of the 
conclusions. In South Africa the study begins in 1983, while that in the Occupied 
Territories begins in 1987 with the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PRESENTATION AND DATA ANALYSIS 
An Analysis of Internal Dynamics 
4.1 The Occupied Territories 
 The political economy of the Intifada  
In order to establish the reasons underlying the intifada’s inability to end the 
occupation, it is vital to understand the political and economic environment that 
underpinned the cause of and course of the uprising. At the beginning of the intifada, its 
main goals included inter alia; “disengagement from Israel, greater self reliance, and end 
to occupation and national independence. By 1991, this had been reduced to a mere 
reestablishment of a Palestinian agenda internationally and reaffirmation of Palestinian 
identity” (Roy, 1991, p. 67).   Dajani (1994) writing on the nature of economic relations 
between Israel and the occupied territories notes that West Bank and Gaza Strip in to 
virtual peripheries that served the Israeli core economy. He notes that land expropriation 
and settlement provided Israel with the best farmlands. These same processes 
transformed Palestinians into “a proletariat of the Israeli economy” (p. 14). 
 The Occupied Territories, Dajani (1994) notes they became markets of Israeli 
products. As indigenous productive activities atrophied, unequal taxation and strict 
regulations governing imports and exports reinforced this trend. This trend was replicated 
in other spheres like water and electricity. Also, severe restrictions on the functions and 
authority of local councils inhibited indigenous development by limiting municipalities 
and using them for patronage. It is such constraints and other restrictive policies that 
came to inspire the first intifada as highlighted in the foregoing analysis. 
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 Explaining the intifada 
Since the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, Israel had outlawed all 
forms of political activity by Arab inhabitants. It was therefore not uncommon for 
Palestinians protesting various aspects of occupation to be met with violent responses 
from the Israeli troops. Hitherto, such protests would be silenced with Israeli fire.  In 
December 1987 however, the crowds did not disperse and instead expanded attracting 
larger crowds that overwhelmed Israeli units (Lustick, 1993). The question here is why?  
An attempt to account for the outbreak of this phenomenon attributes it to several 
factors: Lustick (1993) points to despair and humiliation of Palestinians, PLO’s strategic 
extension for national liberation, a result of grassroots organization, and a reflection of 
changes in Israeli politics toward the territories. Specifically, Schif & Ya’ari (1990) 
emphasize the cumulative rage of Palestinian refuges, workers and farmers. In particular, 
they stress the “unbearable conditions in Gaza refuge camps, the frightening new threats 
to divert water resources to Israeli settlers and the bitterness of Palestinian employed in 
Israel from routine humiliations inflicted upon them by soldiers” (Schif and Ya’ari as 
cited in Lustick, 1993, p. 568). 
Some writers associate the intifada with PLO’s failure to cope with the real needs 
of the people under occupation, failure to produce a plan capable of halting Israel’s de 
facto incorporation of their territory and its inability to maintain unity among the factions.  
As such, unintended consequence of these failures was the Palestinian development of 
their own organized resistance to the occupation that was more effective than what the 
Palestinian external leadership of the PLO would provide (Lustick, 1993). In the same 
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vein, to some analysts, the secret of the uprising lies in the frustration with and 
weakening of PLO’s direct influence over events in the territories. These analysts 
emphasize the crystallization of grassroots organizations that began forming in the late 
1970s. These provided needed services within a national context without external 
financial assistance (Lustick, 1993).  
Hilterman (1992) identifies resource scarcity and the intense competition among 
rival factions as conditions that helped to lay groundwork for the intifada by increasing 
the number of Palestinians mobilized by the unions and women’s organizations. He notes 
that lack of outside funding and fear of being overshadowed by rivals made factions to 
work desperately to mobilize groups that were previously politically inactive (Hilterman, 
as cited in Lustick, 1993). 
Lederman (1988) conceives of the intifada as an “outward manifestation of a 
social revolution that had been underway on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip for more 
than a decade, disillusionment in authority capability to change the conditions of the 
youth and a rejection of traditional authority”( p. 230). Farson and Landis lend credence 
to this gradualism when they explain intifada as cumulative effects of two decades of 
Israeli colonialism in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza. They note that 
the threat of dispossession, dispersion and loss of identity was not lost to Palestinians 
(Farson and Landis as cited in Nassar and Heacock, 1990).  
Beitler (2004) explains the intifada from the Israeli settlement policy. He argues 
that the Likud government which assumed power in 1977 pursued political policies that 
were based on the ideology of greater Israel although this had started immediately after 
the occupation. The so called new facts policy of getting strategic settlements on the 
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ground before any peace agreement increased tensions with the local population and 
incited resentment among the Arabs. He adds that so many settlements were established 
that no Arab village was distant from a Jewish area, a policy which “fueled the fire”. The 
soldiers who remained to protect settlers became more visible increasing the discord 
between the Palestinians and Israelis. This policy sought to deliberately under develop 
the Palestinian economy (Robinson, 2003). 
It is also important to note that soon after 1967, the Israeli government sought to 
implement counterinsurgency measures by restoring normal life patterns and increasing 
people’s material well being and restoring essential services. However, Israel also 
implemented a number of punitive measures to establish order and security and to isolate 
insurgents. Less discriminate use of force and collective punishments after 1977 win by 
the Likud government increased Palestinian resentment contributing to the 1987 intifada 
(Freedman, 1991). 
The downturn of Arab oil economy was another factor that undermined the 
economic wellbeing of Palestinians under occupation. This closed off opportunities for 
many energetic young men who had little to provide for their families. The resultant 
degradation of labor manifested itself politically in increased civil disobedience. The 
relegation of the Palestinian problem in the Amman Arab conference outraged many 
Palestinians under occupation and in exile. In the context of charged political climate and 
high social and economic discontent, Arson and Landis note “the emergence of a united 
organic leadership and the bonding of the vast majority of people in a web of popular 
sovereignties, cemented together by a collectivist and nationalist ideology, were 
sufficient to mobilize Palestinians for action .All that was needed was “a precipitous 
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event to launch it” (Arson & Landis, as cited in Nasser & Peacock, 1990, p. 31). From the 
preceding debate, it is apparent that several factors were at play before the outbreak. But 
the existence of these factors alone was not enough to galvanize Palestinian collective 
action. The following section looks at some of the processes that enabled the popular 
uprising. In particular, I look at mobilization and politicization, growing perceptions of 
relative deprivation resulting from dependency and economic subservience, and what 
Kuzman refers to as perceived political opportunities. 
(i)Mobilization and Politicization  
 Lesch (1990) discussing the political environment before the intifada, notes that 
Gaza experienced a significant increase in both organizational activities and violent 
confrontations. She notes for instance that despite the ban on elections, the affiliates of 
the Palestine Labor Organization held them in 1987. The Union of Construction Workers 
conducted elections in February followed by Union of Workers in Commerce. This was 
held in spite of Israeli security forces’ harassment.  
At the same time, the Palestinian National Council Session held in Algiers 
formerly ended the rifts in the PLO. The Popular Front and Democratic Front resumed 
their seats after a four year boycott. Popular Committees and radical Islamic groups won 
more adherents. Student strikes were followed by government crackdown and political 
deportations that heightened tensions even further.  The deaths of the workers in a van on 
December 8, has been noted as the proximate cause that sparked off the uprising.  This 
was followed by massive demonstrations in the Gaza Strip despite lengthy curfews and 
deaths. The intifada soon acquired the structure through the Unified National Leadership 
of the Uprising (UNLU).Other groups, namely; Fateh, the Popular Front, and the 
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Communist Party shared the leadership of the movement.  In 1988, Hamas was created   
by the Muslim Brotherhood as an alternative to the nationalists with a call to increased 
militarization and islamization of the intifada that rejected any political settlement with 
Israel (Lesch, 1990).  
Tamari (1990) notes that the problems were reinforced by erosion of village 
agriculture and integration of rural youth as an underclass of commuting workers in 
Israeli industries. Israeli subordination of the West Bank and Gazan economies for two 
decades had undermined local elites and caused major dislocations in the regional 
distinctiveness of local community. The extraction of rural and refugee labor form their 
districts in to Israeli labor had created a commonality of collective experience that was 
bound to register itself in the political consciousness...” (Tamari as cited in Lesch, 1990, 
p. 6).    
At the same time, Lesch (1990) notes that social activist groups became more 
prominent during 1987 and made concerted efforts to bring together the diverse political 
forces. In February, the Federation of Charitable Societies initiated a campaign to collect 
donations for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The Working Women’s Committees in 
Gaza held unified meetings as a model for national unity and cosponsored a medical day 
with Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees.     Increased activism by union 
groups, students and activities of Islamic groups led to widespread curfews, deportations 
and repression by the military. Defense minister Yitzhak Rabin confirms the policy 
environment: “We will not lift the iron fist policy imposed on the Gaza strip. We are 
involved in the climax of a continuing war against “terrorism” in Lebanon and in Judea 
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and Samaria. It is an endless war and we have to take measures to reduce military attacks 
to the minimum” (p. 16).  
In response to this, underground grassroots Palestinian activism proliferated that 
in turn attracted collective punishments like home demolitions and arbitrary arrests. It is 
estimated that between 1985 and 1987, an estimated 200 thousand Palestinians had been 
arrested at some point (Nassar and Heacock, 1990). The preceding statement reflected the 
difficulties presented by the contours that facilitated the birth of the uprising, namely; 
mobilization and politicization of Palestinian national consciousness that had developed 
over the years of occupation. Robinson (1993) adds that “such mobilization was 
necessary in order to overcome , at least in part, the class, kin, and regional cleavages that 
had long fragmented the Palestinian society and had been used by occupying powers to 
undermine collective national action” (Robinson, 1993, p. 301). 
(ii)Economic dependency and subservience  
Nassar and Heacock (1990) note that although officially considered independent 
economic unites, the Gaza strip and the West Bank have been forced through post 1967 
war policies into dependency on the physical integration into Israel’s economic system. 
Over the course of occupation, they note, Israel took over the service infrastructure of the 
West Bank and Gaza, confiscated land in the occupied territories and controlled water 
resources reducing these territories to source of labor and as a market for its 
manufactured goods while at the same time restricting the territories external trade. The 
physical infrastructure and transportation and communication systems including electric 
generation units have been linked and controlled by the Israeli grid.   Between 1982 and 
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1985 for instance, “90 percent of imports in the Occupied Territories came from Israel” 
(P. 47). 
Financially, the Occupied Territories were denied means for capital accumulation. 
Soon after occupation, Israeli authorities closed down Arab banks in the West Bank and 
Gaza with negative effects of the Palestinian economy. These were replaced by branches 
of Israeli banks. This combined with prohibition of all foreign exchange transactions and 
a requirement to do all business in Israeli shekels further increased Palestinian reliance on 
Israel with an economy that remained a weak appendage of the Israeli economy (Nassar 
& Heacock, 1990).  
(iii)Growing perceptions of political opportunity and failure of armed struggle 
Lesch (1990) notes that while political and professional groups were 
strengthening their structures that would later provide an underpinning for the intifada, 
Shimon Peres, the Israeli Foreign minister had been deeply concerned about the situation 
that a few days before the intifada, he had proposed to the Knesset that Israel pull out of 
the Gaza strip, demilitarize it and leave residents to their own devises. He had argued that 
Jewish settlements in the strip did not provide any security or benefits for Israel. 
Although this infuriated the two thousand settlers in the Strip, Gazans interpreted this as a 
“fruit of their long resistance and an indication that Israel could be forced to yield” (p. 2).  
Freedman (1991) accounting for the non-violent strategy notes “the physical 
environment for guerilla attacks was no more favorable than before. The PLO had 
recognized the limits of people’s willingness to sacrifice themselves because of their 
economic dependence on Israel. He concludes therefore that “the Palestinian situation 
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provided an environment more conducive to civil disobedience than to armed struggle” 
(p.64). 
On the regional front, like their counterparts in South Africa, non-violent strategy 
was taken up for pragmatic reasons; the Arab countries had failed to defeat Israel 
militarily. After 1982 Lebanon war, the PLO found itself excluded from the peace 
process and ejected from their bases in the Middle East (Freedman, 1991). In South 
Africa, there too was little promise of an organized force of African nations launching a 
successful invasion of South Africa. African countries with the largest armies like 
Ethiopia and Nigeria required their armies for internal control, and yet even if they were 
to mobilize, the apartheid region had unparalleled military machine capable of containing 
any regional threats and yet even at the international level, like in the Occupied 
Territories, opposition from the United States would have prevented any form of United 
Nations or other multinational force being deployed in the area (Zunes, 1999). 
The above discussion attempted to highlight the nature of societal relations on 
economic and political levels between the Israeli state and the people in the Occupied 
Territories. Economically, there existed interdependence that was largely skewed in favor 
of Israel and in extreme cases clearly bordered colonial practice. Politically, the Occupied 
Territories’ structures of governance were subordinate to Israeli control.   Mobilization 
and politicization, perceptions of political opportunity and increasing sense of deprivation 
resulting from occupation policies laid the foundation of the uprising.  
 
 
 
Johannesburg and Jerusalem 
 
37
37
Nonviolent Action: The Occupied Territories   (1987-88) 
Methods 
Dajani (1994) notes that the methods of resistance employed by Palestinians fall 
into three main categories as defined by Sharp and others. These comprise protests, non-
cooperation including civil disobedience, and efforts to establish alternative institutions.  
As highlighted in the previous discussion, these methods became attractive only after the 
recognition of the futility of armed struggle by the armed wings of respective movements, 
of the PLO and the ANC in Palestine and South Africa respectively.  
 (a)Protests 
In the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinians experimented with a variety of tactics; 
these ranged from non-violent demonstrations, sit-ins, and marches displaying the 
Palestinian flag occasioned by some stone throwing. These acts helped to highlight their 
plight and generate international sympathy in this asymmetrical struggle (Dajani, 1994). 
The deliberate selection of nonviolent methods was corroborated by the findings of a 
survey of the communiqués that were issued during the first year and a half of the 
intifada, conducted by the Palestinian center for the Study of Nonviolence. The 
Palestinian protests even managed to recruit some allies from Israel.   
Kaviner (1996) details how both moderates and militants began to notice that the 
new struggle was a unique one. It was not a familiar “terror” story but a non-violent one, 
a full scale civilian uprising. He writes; “by mid February 1988, there were at least thirty 
different organizations which were active in Israel protesting the repression of the 
intifada” (p.48). Some of these organizations such as Peace now, and Yesh Gvul left a 
lasting impression of the protest scene and Israeli political life. This however did not 
Johannesburg and Jerusalem 
 
38
38
translate into mass public action in support of the uprising leaving the proponents of on 
non-violent action in the Occupied Territories to their own devices, isolated and weak.  
(b)Non-cooperation 
    Dajani, (1994) points out a variety of non-cooperation methods employed by 
Palestinians such as general strikes, resignations from the occupation regime’s 
institutions, and withdrawal of labor from Israel, boycotting Israeli goods and products, 
violating curfews and refusing to pay taxes. One such example at non-cooperation 
involved the Beit Sahour tax revolt. This was meant to highlight the illegitimacy of tax 
regulations in the occupied territories. However, the Israeli authorities countered this   by 
“instituting particularly harsh measures in which travel permits, car permits and 
businesses were required to have identity cards issued upon proof of tax payment, making 
this option less viable” (p. 71).   
Even more dramatic was the withdrawal of Palestinian labor from Israel. 
However, the expected impact would soon be offset by the arrival of new Soviet Jewish 
immigrants who replaced Palestinians as a source of cheap labor. Since Palestinians 
lacked a viable indigenous economy of their own, they were unable to totally forgo their 
jobs and sources on income in Israel. “They became vulnerable to Israeli 
countermeasures as they soon discovered they were not in a position to choose whether or 
not to work in Israel” (Dajani, 1994, p. 71).  
(c) Alternative Institutions 
The creation of alternative institutions was another important milestone during the 
intifada. This ranged from creation of specialized committees in the towns, villages, 
camps and neighborhoods in the Occupied Territories, establishment and expansion of 
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Medical Relief Committees, Voluntary Work Committees, to Popular Education 
Committees.  The areas in which these institutions were created were called “liberated 
areas”, in anticipation of and hope for de-facto independence in these places (Dajani, 
1994, p.71).  
However, Dajani (1994) notes that in their attempts at parallel institutions, 
Palestinians soon discovered that breaking away from Israel would not be complete and 
that the creation of alternative institutions had faltered. Dissonance increased between the 
high morale and a sense of empowerment they had experiences through protest actions 
and the reality on the ground.  “The Israeli authorities were able to impose severe 
economic and military reprisals. Tax raids forced Palestinians to resume paying taxes. 
Thousands went back to their jobs in Israel when they found no alternatives in their 
communities. Others rejoined the civil administration in a variety of functions…” (p.72).   
The above methods of nonviolence (protests, noncooperation and establishment of 
alternative institutions) were applied with short term symbolic successes. These 
achievements however could not withstand the Israeli countermeasures to contain the 
uprising due to structural vulnerabilities of the Palestinian society.    
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4.2. The Case of Apartheid South Africa 
The political economy of apartheid 
Describing the nature of apartheid economy, Lowenberg & Kaempfer (2001) note 
that the apartheid system represented a comprehensive set of regulations affecting all 
aspects of economic, social and political life arising essentially as a response on the part 
of the while working class to the threat of black labor market competition. In what they 
call classical apartheid, racial segregation was motivated by white employer concerns to 
secure land and draw up cheap agricultural and mine labor from the rural African sector. 
“the existence of a viable and flourishing and viable black peasant agricultural sector 
raised the opportunity cost of black labor to white farmers, who were consequently 
induced to rely on coercive political instruments to separate blacks from the land and to 
create a pool of wage labor, These were later joined by miners in seeking the state’s help 
in lowering the supply price of black workers” (p. 33). 
The production of market regulations that followed were meant to facilitate 
wealth redistributions away from blacks and white mining and industrial capital owners 
in favor of white workers and agricultural capital owners. After 1948, the National Party 
embarked on an ambitious project of planning-some kind of “ethnic socialism”, This 
comprised of the establishment of what the authors call “grand apartheid”-rigid 
geographical separation in which separate sovereign national entities of would hold 
citizenship together with thoroughgoing regulation of economic and social interactions 
between blacks and white in the “white” parts of the country and where  black workers 
supposedly “sojourned temporarily” (Lowenberg & Kaempfer, 2001, p. 40). 
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However, continuous modernization and expansion of the industrial sector of the 
South African economy increased the demand for highly skilled labor well beyond the 
capacity of the white population alone to supply it, so that some significant concessions 
had to be made to the need for a stable, educated black labor force. These reforms, the 
authors note, were a reflection of the shifting structures of economic interest within the 
white electorate. The adaptations of apartheid policy in the face of changing constraints 
leads the authors to conclude that “racial dogma and jingoistic nationalism were not the 
underlying causes or motives driving apartheid,- they were merely invoked when 
convenient to justify state interventions in the market economy that were intended to 
bring about wealth redistribution of the politically dominant group…hence apartheid can 
be seen as an endogenous policy, the level or intensity of which was determined 
primarily by economic interests and external constraints affecting interest groups” 
(Lowenberg & Kaempfer , 2001, p. 41).   
     Zunes (1999) points out a number of advantages about the political economy of 
South Africa that would indeed have made challenge to it very difficult. For instance, he 
notes “the ruling party controlled some of the world’s richest mineral deposits, including 
one third of the world known reserves. A modern military machine stood ready in the 
area which lacked any other conventional force. Its internal security system was elaborate 
and repressive. ..a modern industrialized state in and underdeveloped region, it created a 
degree of economic hegemony despite almost universal non-recognition of their 
legitimacy. It was a pariah in international diplomacy yet economically and strategically 
integrated in to the Western system” (p. 138). It is perhaps out the recognition of this 
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asymmetrical reality that the antiapartheid movement adopted their strategy as we shall 
see the proceeding section.  
Rationale for non-violence 
As mentioned earlier, the non-violent struggle in South Africa was taken up for 
same pragmatic reasons like that of the Occupied Territories, the armed struggle had 
failed to yield desired results. Zunes (1999) commenting on the choice of this strategy 
notes a number of factors that had made armed struggle unpalatable. Like Israel, South 
Africa was a major industrial and military power capable of defeating any combination of 
its immediate enemies let alone the poorly organized and comparatively few ANC 
insurgents. He notes; “black townships outside South African cities were designed so that 
they could easily be cordoned off and subjected to air strikes making it easy to suppress 
any armed uprising… in the Bantustans, because of their geographical fragmentation and 
handpicked elites, they were not ideal bases for guerrilla warfare” (p.144). Being highly 
urbanized, without jungles in a largely savanna terrain there were no sanctuaries in which 
to retreat to. Guerilla raids from neighboring countries became impossible as South 
African Defense Forces made raids against alleged ANC homes and offices in 
Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho and Zambia which were largely dependent on South 
Africa economically. The neighbors later signed a Peace Treaty with South Africa in 
1984.  
Zunes (1999);  Marais (2001) inform us that it was in the light of this that the 
ANC and other resistance organizations began to question the efficacy of armed struggle 
as they would later admit. In addition, the ANC’s benefactor, the Soviet Union “had 
doubts about ANC's military capability against the regime and had joined western 
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countries in support of a negotiated settlement” (Zunes, 1999, p.145). While they 
maintained their “commitment” to armed struggle as a strategy for disrupting normal 
operations, it had become merely a public relations exercise and by the early 1980s the 
South African opposition reached a clear consensus that liberation had to be pursued 
through nonviolent means. 
Methods 
(a)Non cooperation 
The South African antiapartheid movement employed similar methods of 
nonviolence like the ones discussed above. In early 80s, a Mass Democratic Movement 
was formed which included the informal alliance of the ANC, COSATU, UDF and 
affiliates calling for a non-racial democracy under the leadership of the ANC. The 
formation of the UDF in 1983 was significant in that it was a coalition of nearly 700 
organizations, including civil associations, trade unions, churches, women’s organization 
and religious groups committed to ending all forms of exploitation.  They were able to 
help coordinate nonviolent resistance campaigns such as boycotts, and strike support.  
Zunes (1999) notes that the of 500,000 in 1985 in one federation, Congress of South 
Africa Trade Unions(COSATU) and its commitment to address matters beyond bread and 
butter marked a turning point that brought apartheid to its knees. For instance, in 1987, 
over 20, 000 railway workers struck for over two months, 340, 000 mine workers struck 
the Chamber of miners for three weeks, in 1989, over 3 million person days were lost 
from labor disputes in South Africa (Zunes as cited in Zunes et al., 1999). 
The nationwide two day strike in 1984 terrified the government, “as many as 800 
thousand people refused to go to work and 400,000 students’ boycotted classes” (Zunes, 
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1999, p. 155). In response, the government imposed a state of emergency in 1985 to curb 
the dissent, yet this did not halt the nonviolent movement, charges of treason against 
UDF leaders were dropped in December. The imposition of this state of emergency was 
not only a disastrously unsuccessful effort to control the mass uprising, it also galvanized 
European and American elites into pushing for economic sanctions. “A three day general 
strike in June 1988 of more than 3 million workers paralyzed industry. Another one in 
August 1989 shut down commerce in Pretoria, Johannesburg, Durban and East London 
severely crippling industry in the Western Cape” (Zunes, 1999, p. 156). Widespread rent 
boycotts in Soweto and other townships led forced the government to negotiate in 1989. 
(Smuts and Westcott as cited in Zunes, 1999a). Overall, the unions emerging in the 
1980s displayed the militancy to be expected of a new movement and particularly of one 
attempting to establish itself in an entrenched system. Working in close co-operation with 
shop stewards, they took up every issue affecting their members.  Strike frequency 
increased from 101 strikes in 1979 to 1148 in 1987 (Bendix, 2004).  
(b) Alternative institutions 
Zunes (1999) notes that there was an impressive development of alternative 
institutions effectively creating a situation of dual power in South Africa where 
institutions affecting the daily lives of black South Africans came increasingly to be 
managed by black South Africans themselves. Community clinics, cooperatives, legal 
resource centers, offered places to go when existing institutions were inadequate. Zunes 
attributes the growth of these institutions to the fact that official institutions were no 
longer recognized as legitimate. Non-cooperation became so severe that by the mid 
1980s, “officially sanctioned local governments collapsed” (p.157). The United 
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Democratic Front was formed in 1983 in response to the government’s new proposal to 
give limited representations to Indians and Coloreds in a tricameral Parliament from 
which Africans were excluded. In 1987, COSATU, the UDF and sixteen other 
organizations joined to for Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) that organized its base 
for collective bargaining and self help (Ottaway, 1992).    
(c)Protests 
In the early 1980s, churches became increasingly outspoken. They organized in 
defiance of apartheid and engaged in non-violent resistance led by Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu who headed the South African Council of churches(SACC), representing 22 of the 
nations leading denominations. In 1987, SACC adopted a resolution that questioned the 
legitimacy of the white minority government and called on member churches to question 
their moral obligation to obey apartheid laws. They supported rent boycott, tax resistance, 
and conscientious objection to military service for instance, “25-40 percent of whites 
conscripted did not report to duty” (Eades, 1999, p. 94). The clergy had also begun to 
marry mixed raced couples in defiance of the Prevention of Mixed Marriages Act later 
abolished in 1985. These protests culminated in the New Defiance Campaign of 1989, 
with waves of multiracial peace marches encompassing hundreds of thousands of 
demonstrators in major cities effectively neutralizing the state of emergency. By 
November of that year, the government capitulated to pressure and allowed an ANC rally 
of 70, 000 to take place in a stadium to welcome some of the released political prisoners 
(Zunes, 1999).  The interplay of these activities with international pressure had wide 
ranging repercussions for the political and economic environment of the apartheid system 
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culminating into negotiations that would later lead to the first multiracial elections in the 
early 90s. 
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4.3. Impact Non-violent Movements in Palestine and South Africa 
It is not possible to understand the outcome of collective action in the above cases 
without understanding the impact that these movements had on both the national and 
international levels. As we shall see, political activity in both cases was both a function of 
and a response to the interplay between the national and systemic actions.  
1. The Occupied Territories. 
 (a)Intifada and Israeli politics 
• Opinion, politics and policy 
A survey of the effect of the intifada on the Israeli polity reveals a profound 
impact. Arian et al. (1992) survey of 1, 116 respondents  interviewed between December 
9, 1987 and January 4, 1988, and again in Oct 1988,  revealed that public opinion had 
responded to the intifada, it showed to be sensitive to external and internal political 
developments. “The intifada seemed to force the Israeli public and political leadership to 
think about the future of the territories in a more concrete and realistic manner than they 
had in the past. It spotlighted for Israelis anomalies which were evident and even written 
about but largely ignored. The implication of making no decision about the future of the 
territories and their inhabitants was brought home more powerfully than it had been in the 
previous twenty years.  A protracted situation of a low level, constant violence forced 
Israelis to confront issues which many of them had conveniently pushed aside. This was 
brought to a head as much of the world’s media treated Israel’s policy in dealing with the 
intifada in a very negative manner” (p. 318). 
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The intifada affected the political process in three ways based on the public threat 
perception. Arian et al. (1992) notes that on long term goals, there seemed to be a 
tendency towards greater moderation and compromise, yet in terms of short term 
concerns, Israelis remained hawkish as ever and supported a strong hand, and a growing 
polarization of attitude and political power between the more conciliatory left and the 
more hard-line right.  For instance, there was a growing moderation regarding the future 
of the territories in the survey, while Jewish polls showed they wanted more stern 
measures although the national samples indicated they were willing to return territories 
and to consider an eventual Palestinian state and to enter in to negotiations with the PLO, 
on condition it recognized Israel and denounced terrorism. 
 However, support for immediate negotiations with the PLO plummeted, this 
exemplifies attitudinal hardening with short term implications while in the opposite 
direction, “support for a comprehensive agreement and return of territory in the long run 
however grew” (Arian, as cited in Freedman, 1992, p. 281). 
Table 1.1 
The Distribution of Scores on the Policy Position Scale, 1987 and 1988 
Policy 1987 
  Dove Middle Hawk Total 
 Dove 19.3 7.0 5.1 31.3 
Policy 1988 Middle 7.5 11.0 8.7 27.2 
 Hawk 5.8 16.1 19.5 41.4 
 Total 32.5 34.2 33.3 100 
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The above table presents the 1987 array of responses, used as the base for 
dividing the respondents into three groups of roughly equal size. The movement favored 
the hawkish end of the scale. The center depleted by a fifth between two time periods, 
from 34 to 27 percent while the hawk pole grew from a third to 41 percent while the dove 
retained its third of the sample (Arian et al., 1992). 
Table 1.2: A survey of Israeli public opinion  
 Change of Scale of Policy Positions by Vote 
 1987 score 1988 score N t-value 
Vote     
Likud vote 3.42 3.67 110 
2.78 
Labor vote 2.73 2.79 111 0.76 
     
Likud vote 3.34 3.73 137 5.24 
Labor vote 2.74 2.50 106 -3.08 
 
According to this survey the tendency for political polarization was evident when 
perceived effect of the intifada was compared with answers of respondents to policy 
questions. Those who said that the intifada had hardened their attitudes were likely to 
have held hard-line views before the uprising. The opposite was true with those with 
dovish views. The shifts in either way were statistically insignificant although the overall 
shift favored the right (Arian et al., 1992). 
Another poll conducted by Ma’ariv, a moderately right wing paper however 
showed a significant swing to the right. “The Labor Alignment which won 45 seats in 
Johannesburg and Jerusalem 
 
50
50
November 1987 polls dropped by March 1988 to 39, while Likud moved from 38 to 39 
with significant minorities tending to vote for smaller parties on the extreme sides of the 
political spectrum” (Bar-On, 1988, p. 54).   
(b) Between territorial maximalism and territorial compromise 
Tessler (1990) writing of the effect of the intifada on Israeli politics, notes the 
intifada reinforced and deepened political divisions as the uprising seemed to confirm the 
analysis of each camp thereby rendering their prescriptions more persuasive. On the one 
hand, territorial maximalists argued that the uprising was an expression of Palestinian and 
Arabs in general to the Jewish state despite the hitherto improved living standards of 
Palestinians under the occupation. To the left, advocates of territorial compromise raised 
the democratic issue and “articulated it with the urgency that was infrequent in the past” 
(p.52). They argued that trends in demographic patterns favored Palestinians; hence in the 
near future Israel could not preserve its Jewish and democratic character with continued 
occupation. 
The solution to this quagmire was as opposite as was the perception of opposing 
camps in Israel about the uprising itself. To the right, the solution could well have lied in 
the “transfer”, where Palestinians are removed in significant numbers form the West 
Bank and Gaza. To the left, they saw the uprising in terms of costs Israel will have to 
bear by continued occupation hence they were determined to save their country from this 
mess (Tessler, 1990). From this dilemma, Tessler notes “it follows that the intifada added 
an important measure of realism to the thinking of both the left and the right… It is this 
realism that drives both the advocates of territorial maximalism and territorial 
compromise to embrace prescriptions that were so marginal to political thinking in Israel 
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before the intifada” (P. 60). Despite the polarization, Tessler (1990) notes that this did not 
fundamentally change the political balance in Israel.  The question is why? The final 
chapter (5) attempts to address this.    
(c)Intifada and the Israeli economy 
The effect of the uprising on the Israeli in the first two years was about $1 billion. 
These were concentrated in certain areas of the Israeli economy and the West Bank and 
Gaza. It “cost the Israeli economy 2.5 percent of its GDP” (Rosen as cited in Freedman, 
1991, p. 370). The effects were concentrated in agriculture, construction and tourism. The 
larger effects were however overshadowed by long term adjustment and stabilization 
efforts in the Israeli economy. Strong economic performance in the intifada years 
shielded the Israeli economy from the consequences of the intifada although economic 
performance in Gaza and the West Bank continued to decline. This was in contrast to 
South Africa where her exclusion from international capital markets, disinvestment, arms 
embargoes, declining Growth Domestic Product (GDP) and high inflation against the 
backdrop of a shrinking white population were harder to deal with (Eades, 1999).  
(d) Intifada and the international world 
In the United States, there developed a new emphasis on direct political talks 
between Israelis and Palestinians. However,  “momentous changes in Eastern Europe and 
the  former Soviet Union continued to push the Israeli-Palestinian issue into the 
background of global policy discussions in Washington”( Pollock as cited in Freedman, 
1991, p.130), unlike in South Africa, where they led a massive disinvestment campaigns 
against the apartheid regime.  
Johannesburg and Jerusalem 
 
52
52
On the Soviet Union, Freedman (1991) draws two conclusions from his analysis of 
the Soviet policy toward the intifada; (1) that despite USSR’s criticism of Israel’s 
handling of the intifada, the Soviet-Israeli relations continued to improve in large number 
of areas from people to people diplomacy  to Soviet Jewish immigration although 
Moscow continued to rebuff  Israeli efforts to restore full diplomatic relations, and (2) 
that Soviet support for the PLO remained limited, and while USSR stepped up its 
contacts after the US-PLO dialogue in December 1988, the fact that it was 
simultaneously improving its ties with Israel, weakened the Soviet-PLO relationship”( p. 
176). 
Alin (1994) adds that Palestinian resistance in the territories heightened the regional 
status of the PLO, increased international sympathy for Palestinians and prompted the 
United Sates to assume a lead role in initiating a diplomatic process that aimed at 
convening some form of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. It reoriented 
the Arab-Israeli conflict back to its historic Israeli-Palestinian core. Jordan severed ties 
with the West Bank giving up the central role of determining the final political status to 
Palestinians. Subsequent US dialogue with PLO presented important prospects for the 
national movement. Perhaps the biggest achievement was the eventual mutual 
recognition between PLO and Israel and the subsequent Declaration of Principles for an 
interim self government, yet this can not solely be attributed to the “nonviolent’” phase of 
the intifada as it became increasingly militarized and “Islamized” abdicating its earlier 
commitment to nonviolence.   
In analyzing the nonviolent phase of the intifada, we can say that perhaps its greatest 
success lied in creating cognitive dissonance about the Israeli collective identity in a large 
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segment of the Israeli public. Sucharov (2005) writing on the psychoanalysis of the 
Israeli Palestinian peace notes that the existential threat of politicide that Israel 
historically faced had created a consensus of the need to unite for self defense to prevent 
national annihilation. The Israeli experience in the 80s and the early 1990 as an aggressor 
therefore clashed with their defensive warrior identity. The Lebanon’s “war of choice” 
was an anathema to Israelis’ role identity. During the intifada, Palestinain actions 
whereby their mostly civil protests pitted guns against Palestinian youth prompted 
Israelis to realize that their government’s policy of occupation clashed with the country’s 
own identity of fighting only “wars of no alternative”. This resulted in “a painful 
dissonance for large segments of Israeli policy resulting in an olive branch to the PLO” 
(p. 159). It is important to note that this gesture however, was not followed any 
fundamental shift in policy over the Occupied Territories as was the case in South Africa 
where the National Party leaders began to negotiate themselves out of power when the 
political and economic situation became untenable. 
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2. South Africa 
(a)The Effect the Antiapartheid Movement on the Apartheid Regime 
The antiapartheid movement in South Africa had a profound effect on the policy 
of the apartheid regime. Zunes (1999) accounting for this impact, he notes that the high 
degree of interdependence albeit in unfair terms imposed by the ruling white minority, 
allowed greater latitude for manipulation through non-violent means than is possible in 
classically polarized societies. Since the daily lives of white minority was dependent on 
blacks, he argues that non-violent action constituted a more direct challenge to the 
apartheid system than violence. He further points to the existence of black South Africa’s 
overwhelming majority as having made the use of nonviolent action particularly effective 
when they mobilized in larger numbers. 
He adds “the shift to largely nonviolent orientation lured white popular opinion 
away from those seeking continued white domination as it made the prospects of living 
under majority rule less frightening….. it was seen as indicative of tolerant attitudes by 
the black majority that was not likely to lead to previously anticipated reprisals upon 
seizing power” (Zunes, 1999, p. 163). 
It also attracted previously unsympathetic whites to actively support a for 
instance, a number of squatter settlements near Cape Town which created a climate of 
divisiveness within the authorities (Zunes, 1999) besides, it allowed far greater potential 
for creating cleavages among the privileged white minority , such as how to respond to 
the resistance. 
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(b)External world and the antiapartheid struggle 
Internationally, by mid to later 80s, world opinion had led industrialized countries 
to impose sanctions on the apartheid regime. Labor unions, churches, students and leftist 
organizations in these countries made business as usual, with the apartheid government 
very difficult. This upsurge in solidarity is attributed to the antiapartheid movement’s use 
of nonviolent struggle (Zunes, 1999). 
 Aside from the above, the contribution of the external world to the fall of 
apartheid ranged from sports boycotts and sanction regimes to disinvestment and 
divestment campaigns. The last two were perhaps the most effective of all the influences 
the external world had on apartheid. Lowenberg and Kaempfer (2001) using a public 
choice model, analyze the political effects of disinvestment on apartheid South Africa. 
They note that financial sanctions, depending on how broadly they are applied, might be 
an immediate closing of the target’s access to important sources of foreign exchange. 
They thus argue that the announcement of major foreign banks in 1985 that they would 
no longer roll over South African debt when it became due was potentially the most the 
most effective of the sanctions measures imposed against South Africa. As a result, they 
note that the South Africa government temporarily suspended dealings in foreign 
exchange and then announced a moratorium on repayment of $12 billion of outstanding 
debt. Subsequently, a rescheduling agreement was negotiated between South Africa and 
the foreign banks. 
  The result of withdrawal of foreign debt was that South Africa was forced to 
maintain a large enough surplus of export earnings over import payments to offset the 
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large capital account deficits, thereby enabling it to repay its creditors. That the need to 
maintain trade surpluses, already made difficult by the presence of sanctions on South 
Africa’s  exports, placed a constraint on growth of the South African economy, because 
“any increase in economic activity would have increased import demand and therefore 
had to be contained by means of contractionary monetary and fiscal policy” (Lowenberg 
& Kaempfer, 2001, p.138). The authors however argue that falling asset prices due to 
disinvestment were actually a boon to the South African government. In their analysis, 
South African wealth holders were able to sell their foreign assets in order to put 
domestic assets that were offered for sale at below market prices by disinvesting 
foreigners. As a result, “South African earned higher rates of return to their wealth. Since 
their incomes were subject to taxation, it provided an expanded tax base from which the 
government could extract more revenue to finance the apartheid policies” (p.139), and 
that “divestment might actually have harmed blacks by reducing their incomes” 
(p.140).In 1985 however, South Africa under pressure from the antiapartheid movement 
imposed a state of emergency. According to Zunes (1999) this had an effect of 
galvanizing European and American elites in to pushing for economic sanctions. 
(c)Impact on the economy  
On the impact of sanctions on apartheid, Lowenberg & Kaempfer (2001) use a 
time series analysis of sanctions on South Africa in which they conclude that “sanctions 
were endogenous in that they were influenced by changes in political and economic 
conditions in South Africa” (p.191). They note that perceived increases in the intensity of 
liberation struggle inevitably brought forth more sanctions. Their time series analysis also 
shows a relationship between sanctions and strike activity. They note “there was an 
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immediate effect on the number of black workers on strike, thus there is evidence to say 
that in the short team, it helped domestic opposition groups organize collective action 
among their members” (p.192). “Increases in sanctions tended to follow on the heels of 
increases in domestic black political dissent, and the sanctions then produced feedback 
effects on black dissent” (p.193). They however acknowledge that despite their 
endogeneity, sanctions might have had an important impact on policy formation in South 
Africa by changing the political effectiveness of opposition interest groups in that country 
“. …sanctions had a positive short term effect on black political activism as measured by 
strikes, but in the longer run, the negative effects of sanctions on black employment and 
earnings reduced black worker’s ability to participate in strikes” (p.193) . 
In explaining the failure of apartheid therefore, they point to the “intrinsic 
weaknesses embedded in the apartheid system” (Lowenberg and Kaempfer, 2001, p.194). 
They argue that these weaknesses would have destroyed apartheid even without 
sanctions. They note; “many of the economic and political difficulties encountered by 
South Africa under were intrinsic to the system itself, of which they attribute to “self 
inflicted wounds” (p. 195). They argue that the policies implemented by the regime 
became unaffordable thereby planting the seeds of its failure. As such, they attribute 
political and economic reform primarily to internal dynamics to which external dynamics 
responded as captured in the following: “in many cases, South Africa’s vulnerability to 
external influences was enhanced by domestic policies. In the same vein, those domestic 
policies exposed South Africa to damage from international sanctions. To the extent that 
sanctions were a proximate cause of the collapse of apartheid, this was largely due to self 
imposed vulnerability of South Africa’s economy. They note; “sanctions were applied by 
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foreign interest groups precisely because these groups perceived that the economic and 
political weaknesses of the South African apartheid offered fertile ground for sanctions to 
work” (p. 195). As a result, they conclude that the South African government abdicated 
power because of after recognizing that apartheid policies “had become too expensive to 
maintain as a result of misguided development policies of the National party” (p.218). 
They observe that given the National Party’s superior military and police 
apparatus, they could have clung to power indefinitely. But the cost of doing this would 
have eroded the living standard of whites and that the cost of protecting apartheid 
exceeded the cost of redistribution that would come with power transfer. Having said 
that, they add that the ultimate blow to apartheid “was not so much the  overall 
macroeconomic performance or the aggregate welfare of society as it was the effects of 
racial discrimination and reform of the incomes of politically powerful white groups” 
(Lowenberg and Kaempfer, 2001, p. 225). They point to the fact that unlike in 1948, an 
Afrikaner capital owning class had been created that had some interests as English 
speaking capital owners. This created a division between these and the middle class some 
who defected to the conservative party. At the same time, “the ideological dominance of 
the ruling bloc was at its lowest ebb and was being challenged by crystallizing visions on 
an alternative order” (Morais, 2001, p. 57).   This pushed the National Party to the 
political center inducing it to adopt reformist policies. With dwindling disciples of 
apartheid therefore, apartheid came to be seen as intolerable hence it had to be dismantled 
(Lowenberg & Kaempfer, 2001). 
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Fig. 1.1 
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Figure 1.1 shows sanctions against South Africa 1946-1988. This data include actual 
sanctions imposed, boycotts, disinvestment, divestment, isolation by foreign 
governments, banks, educational institutions, regional and international organization.   
Data from Schoeman (1988) as cited in Schock (2005).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
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Notice escalation of sanctions after 1985 following the declaration of a state of 
emergency. By 1989, the US alone had withdrawn over 160 companies from South 
Africa (Wolpe, 1989).  
 
Johannesburg and Jerusalem 
 
60
60
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
5.1. Discussion and Analysis 
In my methodology section, I indicated that this study will be based on Most 
Similar Systems Design. The cases were selected based on their high comparative quality 
relative to other cases. This study used South Africa and the Occupied Territories of 
Israel/Palestine for case analysis.  Aspects of comparison involved the nature of relations 
between the state and its subjects in economic and political terms, and the nature of 
external relations of these countries in terms of their dependence on or interdependence 
with the external world for their economic and political survival. Using structural and 
perceived opportunities, national and international opportunities, radical flank effects and 
clear and limited goals as bases for understanding the dynamics that affect the practice of 
nonviolence, this study established that cost is the constant variable in explaining cross-
national variations in outcomes of nonviolent struggles as presented in the foregoing. 
From the analysis of non-violence in the two cases, it is apparent that both 
movements used similar methods of nonviolence as articulated by Sharp. Of particular 
relevance to our analysis are the three main categories. These involved protests, non-
cooperation and establishment of alternative institutions. While both movements 
vigorously applied these methods, the results were dramatically different. Whereas in 
South Africa, the struggle survived to witness the collapse of apartheid, the intifada 
except for cosmetic political changes of mutual recognition and the later day 
establishment of Palestinian Authority with limited territorial and political jurisdiction, 
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they did not succeed to end the occupation. Using the conceptual and theoretical 
framework in chapter two and three this discussion explains the different outcomes.  
On structural and perceived opportunities, I argue that while both movements 
perceived the existence of opportunities for political action, the Occupied Territories of 
Palestine public’s judgments were based on the perceived willingness of the Israeli 
government to yield to pressure as illustrated in the literature by Peres’ and Labor party’s 
desire to address the Palestinian problem through his suggestion to withdraw from the 
Occupied Territories. This was a misperception. While the Lebanon war and continued 
occupation had been costly, it was not enough to lead to significant policy shifts in the 
territories under Israeli occupation. Whereas by the late 80s, it was apparent even to the 
National party’s ruling elite that the apartheid project was becoming dysfunctional, elite 
divisions were growing and the National Party, the architect of apartheid was fast losing 
popularity as illustrated by the following excerpt from notes of a special cabinet meeting 
in March 1986: 
 Internal violence and foreign pressure was on the increase, and President Botha 
wanted to know whether the NP should implement more dramatic things in the 
country, in place of the program of gradual adaptation which apparently was not 
taken to heart by anybody. Mr Heunis (Minister of Constitutional Planning and 
Development) responded by saying (a) the NP did not know where it was going, 
and (b) the government was not in position to deal with the circumstances in the 
country. Mr. De Klerk was of the opinion that (a) negotiations with people who 
counted were on the rocks, (b) he was almost powerless because qualifications 
which accompanied change were often allowed to lapse, (c) there were 
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fundamental differences over where the NP and the country was heading, and (d) 
measures of the present did not meet the demands of the time (Marais, 2001, p. 
65).  
At the same time, there were two developments that combined to create a 
favorable balance of forces within the National party; the weight of the white working 
class and petite bourgeoisie had been supplanted by the white middle classes. This was 
costly to the proponents of apartheid as the new group which was reformist in orientation 
demanded an end to apartheid policies (Marais, 2002).  Indeed, the power of this 
reformist group was highlighted in the 1992 referendum in which they overwhelmingly 
voted for an end to apartheid (Ottaway, 1993).  
  With regard to national and international opportunities, nationally, the capitalist 
class had emerged as a core social base of the National Party and power had been 
centralized within the party (Marais, 2001). Schock (2005) observes that the international 
context may influence political contention directly by shaping the balance of power 
within countries of indirectly thorough its impact on national political structures. The 
degree and nature of external influence are shaped by the type of a country’s 
interdependencies. South Africa and Israel were capitalist economies that were heavily 
tied to the industrial West for their capital and investment. As such, they are highly 
vulnerable to external actions.  However, while external pressure in the form of 
divestment, disinvestment, and sanctions threatened the foundations of apartheid as a 
result of loss of support for the National Party following the economic downturn, 
international pressure on Israel was more muted and subtle. Except for widespread 
condemnations of Israeli counterinsurgency strategy, it did not amount to any serious 
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measures that would threaten the economic and political survival of the Jewish state. As a 
matter of fact, the economy performed better two years into the intifada (as highlighted in 
chapter four). Also, nationally, the Palestinians were more dependent on Israeli that Israel 
was on them for their economic survival making them highly vulnerable to Israeli 
sanctions. The inverse is true is South Africa the over reliance on cheap black labor for 
made the apartheid government vulnerable to labor strikes from the antiapartheid 
movement.    
Part of the answer to this paradox lies in Lowenberg & Kaempfers’(2001) public 
choice analysis of sanctions.  Since sanctions from a source country are often determined 
by interest groups in those counties, we can argue, that the Palestinians unlike their 
counterparts in South Africa, did not have a big enough, good enough domestic 
constituency well organized in the source country to push for their agenda. Indeed, the 
intifada’s relatively late entry in to the crowded pool of world politics might have limited 
their ability to mobilize foreign constituencies.    
Concerning the radical flank effects on Israeli policy, it is worth restating that 
there are two types; a positive radical flank effect which happens when the leverage of a 
moderate is strengthened by the presence of a radical with that makes moderate demands 
appear reasonable and  a negative flank effect which tends to undermine the leverage of 
the moderates. The findings in this study reveal mixed fortunes. From our analysis, the 
adoption of non-violence strategy was largely due to the failure of armed struggle. 
However, in South Africa, while the adoption of a nonviolent strategy in the 80s was 
largely influenced by the failure of armed struggle. The armed struggle had previously 
not had a significant effect on the policy shifts of the South African government anyway. 
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Marais (2001) aptly captures this in the following statement, “it was not so much the 
prospect of a revolution that jolted apartheid managers, it was the likelihood that the state 
and the opposition would become entangled in a death embrace that would destroy South 
Africa’s integrity as a national state and viable zone for capital accumulation” (Marais, 
2001, p. 65). Armed struggle had however been a huge morale booster, as mentioned in 
chapter two, that inspired other efforts gradually declining with the rise of non-violence 
(Zunes, 1999). Similarly, there is no evidence that the intifada had positive radical flank 
effect on Israel policy. In fact, as illustrated in the opinion polls in this study, as the 
intifada became militarized, it further polarized Israeli public opinion to more extreme 
positions as the center shrank considerably on short term goals like negotiating with the 
PLO while softening only on long term issues for instance, the possibility of a two state 
solution for the Occupied Territories. The radical flank effect was therefore negative in 
the short run as the infusion of violence reduced the leverage of “the moderates” 
committed to nonviolence.    
Another important requirement for successful nonviolent collective action 
according Kruegler and Ackerman should be clear and limited goals. Movement’s goals 
should be clearly defined, limited in scope and compelling enough to attract the widest 
possible support and must be understood by all parties. The goals for the antiapartheid 
movement had been widely recognized as ending apartheid and transfer of political 
power to the black majority in South Africa, the goals of the intifada was to end 
occupation and pave way for self determination. However, there were fundamental 
differences; unlike the PLO, the ANC carried clandestine activities and inspired political 
action within the blacks in South Africa, the PLO had almost become detached from 
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situation in the territories and had been reduced to a weak external agitator. Lack of goal 
coordination between the internal organizations and the PLO resulted in to absence of a 
clear strategy that would mobilize internal and external forces.   Their initial goal of 
reclaiming the whole of historic Palestine lacked support and widespread international 
support.  Also, unlike in the Occupied Territories,  South Africa’s movement had matured 
over time and had long established structures which through unionized labor under the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Council of 
Churches led by Desmond Tutu, had formed a Mass Democratic Movement during at a 
time when ANC was banned (Ottaway, 1993). These were relatively well coordinated in 
political mobilization and mass actions with an objective of ending apartheid that found 
support in Western pressure groups that together helped in paving the way for a 
democratic South Africa. The intifada, as we have seen in this study was a sudden 
explosion which developed the hitherto infant resistance structures only in the course of 
the uprising. In the ensuing chaos therefore, it was difficult for it to develop clear and 
limited objects within the environment of such cataclysm.  It also had fewer dependable 
allies outside the Occupied Territories.    
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5.2. Findings 
The objective of this research was to examine factors that enable nonviolent 
movements to realize their objectives while constraining them in others. In my 
comparative analysis of the Occupied Territories and apartheid South Africa, I found a 
number of what I will call here “differential factors” that accounted for the variability in 
the outcomes in these highly comparable environments of political contention. These 
included; economics, nature of interdependence, threat perception, resilience and 
alliances.  
Economics 
As we have seen in Lowenberg and Kaempfer’s analysis, apartheid was build to 
promote white economic preeminence, a form of “white socialism” with a capitalist 
economy.    Therefore, political entrepreneurs whipped up as their mission, the 
perpetuation of white privilege not only for their personal aggrandizement but as also to 
justify the maintenance of a police state (Shearing, 1986). When the economy began 
crumbling following massive disinvestment and divestment campaigns therefore, the 
regime lost its base support within the National Party as result of the deteriorating 
economic conditions of the white middle class. Threatened at their political survival, the 
ruling elite reluctantly made concessions that led negotiations with the antiapartheid 
movement.  
This misfortune however did not befall Israel in its struggle against the intifada. 
As this study shows, the Israel economy was only temporarily disturbed by the intifada. 
As illustrated in this enterprise, the economy recovered and boomed three years in to the 
intifada. While we can’t tell how the Israeli government would have reacted had the 
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intifada had a huge negative effect on their economy, we can conclude as illustrated in 
this project, that the fact that there was already a debate going on about the cost of 
occupation especially following the Lebanon war, a similar campaign of disinvestment 
and sanctions would have led to significant policy changes although it may have had an 
initial impact of hardening positions to the right as opinion polls have revealed above.  
Nature of interdependence 
As discussed in the literature review, the structural conditions of society namely, 
the nature of its economic and political dependency determines the general capacity of 
society to control its leaders (Sharp, 1973). Since the assumption of nonviolence is that a 
government’s power is based on obedience and cooperation and therefore sufficient 
withdrawal of cooperation and obedience would bring about change in government, as 
indicated in here, the structural conditions in South Africa were more favorable to a 
nonviolent direct action. An overwhelming majority of white South Africans relied on 
black labor for their daily living. Zunes (1999) notes, “the high degree of 
interdependence albeit on unfair terms allowed greater latitude for manipulation though 
non-violent means than is possible in classically polarized societies” (p. 162). 
Withdrawal of this support therefore had a strong impact to the general performance of 
the economy and the individual welfare of their white minority. At the height on the 
movement, millions of working class people were mobilized.  In the Occupied Territories 
however, although Israel relied on Palestinians for cheap labor and deepened Palestinian 
dependency, the Israeli economy was not build primarily around its dependency on 
Palestinian labor. Consequently, the impact of Palestinian resistance on the economy was 
negligible (1 $billion or 2.5 it’s GDP, reaching $1.8 billion by 1990) and which quickly 
Johannesburg and Jerusalem 
 
68
68
recovered afterwards (Lustick, 1993). Azmi Bishara adds that although the intifada made 
“the occupation a losing economic proposition for Israel…the uprising can not defeat 
Israel economically. . .Because of the polarization of Israeli politics on the issue of the 
disposition of the territories, the transformation of occupation into an economic liability 
is necessary but hardly sufficient for Israeli withdrawal….it will require more Israeli 
casualties, strong external pressure and an alliance between Israeli antiannexationists and 
Palestinians to overcome the political power of the Israeli right wing and make the 
irrationality of the occupation politically decisive”(Bishara as cited in Lustick, 1993). 
The cost of strikes and boycotts amid disinvestment campaigns on the other hand 
threatened to stability of the political structure of apartheid paving the way for its 
eventual dismantlement(Frankel et al., 1988; Lowenberg & Kaempfer, 2001). 
Threat perception 
This study also revealed the fundamental role of threat perception and the publics’ 
willingness to support or oppose government policy. It is important to mention that by 
threats, I mean either existential as was the case in Palestine/Israeli public sphere or 
economic as was the case in apartheid South Africa (both aspects existed in some degree 
in both cases). As indicated in this research, while the outbreak of intifada on a whole 
increased a sense of existential threat in the Israeli public thereby tilting the public 
slightly to a more hawkish direction, the intensification of the antiapartheid activities 
managed to divide the white minorities to a more reformist direction over the fate of their 
country. The answer to this lies in the internal dynamics of the two struggles.  
Zunes (1999) notes that this was possible in South Africa because the movement 
managed to win allies in the white community who were becoming increasingly less 
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frightened at the prospect of living under a majority rule. The financial costs however had 
become unbearable helping to ripen conflict for resolution (read Lieberfeld, 1999).   The 
opposite was true in the Occupied Territories.  Given Arab-Israeli hostile history, the 
uprising appeared to confirm the fears that the Arabs forever posed an existential threat to 
them. Even the doves in Israel feared and still do, that incorporating Palestinian demands 
will erase the  “Jewishness”  of the state of Israel they have worked so hard to 
build(Barak, 2007), even though initially the emerging national and international threats 
influenced the political elites’ willingness to negotiate (Lieberfeld, 1999).   
Resilience 
The resilience of nonviolent resistance is important in the face of coercive 
measures that are often employed to counter perceived challenges to the state. Yet 
persistence requires some level of independence, in the sense that the movement has 
alternative means of survival. This study has established that although both cases were 
characterized by asymmetrical dependencies, whereas the Bantustans relied heavily on 
subsidies and remittances from Pretoria, they enjoyed a relatively fair subsistence 
economy(Becker, 1987), and possessed a crucial leverage though labor to Pretoria which 
in the later years allowed their unionized labor to survive possible government 
countermeasures. The government policy of creating “Bantu homelands” though 
economically dependent on South Africa, had an effect not only of reinforcing national 
identities and creating an economic subsistence (albeit weak) and  political consciousness 
that would lay the foundation for a sustained political activism (Deegan, 2001).  On the 
other side however, the Palestinian uprising lacked a local subsistence economy that 
would sustain the uprising long enough, yet their labor was equally dispensable by Israel. 
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This forced many Palestinians back to return to their jobs in Israel abandoning collective 
action and thereby reducing its efficacy. 
Alliance with base 
One of the distinguishing features between the nonviolent movement in South 
Africa and the intifada was the formers’ ability to win over the base of the National party, 
the middle class and the capitalists. The subsequent alliance posed an existential blow to 
the very survival of the National Party. With widening rifts among the party elites, the 
party found itself increasingly isolated and vulnerable to pressures emanating from the 
antiapartheid movement (Eades, 1999).  As illustrated in the survey of the Israeli public 
opinion, the opposite was true. As the intifada intensified, so was the hardening of Israeli 
public opinion towards the right on short term issues like negotiations with the PLO, 
although the opinion moderated  on long term goals for instance concerning the future of 
the Occupied Territories (Arian et al., 1992). This further reduced the pro-peace 
constituency in Israel in the meantime. Also, although the public in general became more 
polarized, there is no evidence of serious divisions within the political elite over the 
question of Palestine that would threaten the viability of the Israeli political system as 
happened in South Africa. The reason for this is beyond the scope of this study. However, 
if we can draw from the South African experience, we can argue that it is probably 
because the intifada did not threaten the economic life of the wider public and neither did 
it threaten the survival of the political class.   
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5.3. Conclusions 
In analyzing cross national variations in outcomes of non-violent struggles, this 
study set out to investigate a possible ‘constant’ variable(s), whose degree of presence or 
lack of it is central in explaining movement outcomes. In my hypothesis, I asserted that 
interdependence at various levels of the political and economic spectrum is the central 
variable in determining outcomes of collective action. Drawing on the political process 
and nonviolence theories, I compared apartheid South Africa and the Occupied 
Territories of Israel/Palestine; environment of the struggle, the actors and their 
interrelationships using Schock’s framework of analysis of unarmed insurrections. 
Whereas initial results may indicate that a high degree of interdependence 
contributed to partial relative success of for instance, strikes on the economy in both 
cases, the deciding factor in the South African case was an alliance of local and 
international interest groups such as the World Council of Churches private companies, 
Congressional Black Caucus in the US and International Organizations such as the 
Commonwealth, International Olympic Committee, the United Nations and others that 
resulted in massive disinvestment and divestment campaigns that changed the political 
equation in South Africa.  In the Occupied Territories, the skewed interdependence in 
favor of Israel had a net negative impact on the movement as it contributed to the 
vulnerability of the intifada to Israeli sanctions.  
External support and mobilization of powerful third parties as proposed by 
Schock while they appear to have influenced and still   can influence events in places like 
South Africa and Israel(and did so in the former more than the later), these may have less 
influence in ‘big’ places like China which may be immune to external pressures or 
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countries where they (third parties) have less influence based on the nature of their 
economic and political relationships, indeed, where the target countries are not easily 
vulnerable hence can not be generalized.   
In my findings, the four differential factors in the two cases explaining their 
varied outcomes are; economics, nature of interdependence, threat perception, movement 
resilience and alliances point to one overarching denominator;  ‘cost’. I argue that the 
cost real or perceived, of economic and political, of collective or individual implications 
within or without, to movements and political elites were responsible for actions or 
inactions that were undertaken by the parties in both Jerusalem and Johannesburg. Threat 
perception, dependency, resilience and alliances can be viewed from the perspective of 
‘identity’ costs, ‘economic’ costs, or political costs of prolonged struggles respectively 
either by reducing or increasing this cost.   This leads me to conclude that both the 
political class and the nonviolent interest groups are inspired or constrained by this 
perceived   cost in their decision to persist on or capitulate to pressures from the opposing 
side. This is based on my assumption of the rationality of groups, collectivities, and 
polities’ goal seeking behavior. Deutsch (1978) a proponent of this thinking opines that 
organized “systems try out different kinds of behavior toward their environment and enter 
into different situations in relation to it; and they could then stay with those types and 
stay in those situations in which their own internal disequilibria or tensions would be 
smallest through a feedback system” (p.91). 
  In relation to South Africa, Marais aptly captures this in his analysis of the 
existing dilemma of the apartheid government in 1986. He notes, that by the late 1980s, 
the former South African president P.W. Botha had warned that whites had to “adapt or 
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die”, yet it was clear that adaptation within the apartheid paradigm offered no escape 
(Marais, 2001).  We are also told that the adoption and persistence of this strategy was 
largely informed by these calculations, namely, the relative impotence of armed struggle.  
The political  changes witnessed in South Africa and the Occupied Territories therefore 
were a reflection  of individual group’s or person’s assessment of long-term costs of 
continued engagement or disengagement as opposed solely  a to the high degree of 
interdependence. While the interplay of local, national and international factors is 
important in analyzing the effectiveness of non-violence, it is the extent to which this 
interplay affect the cost of the parties that determines the contours and outcome of 
nonviolence.  The cost should be such that it is unattractive enough to deny the 
challenged group or persons the ability to determine the outcome in a nonviolent 
bargaining. In a “Force more Powerful”, Ackerman & Duval eloquently capture this in 
their writing; “nonviolent resistance becomes a force more powerful than the hand of an 
oppressor to the extent that it takes away his capacity for control. Embracing nonviolence 
for its own sake does not produce this force. A strategy for action is needed, and that 
strategy has to involve attainable goals, movement unity, and robust sanctions that restrict 
the opponent...When the regime realizes it can no longer dictate the outcome, the premise 
and means of its power implode. Then the end is only a matter of time” ( Ackerman & 
Duval as cited in McCarthy, 2001) Based on this study, I conclude that the perceived cost 
in economic, political and other dimensions therefore becomes the key variable in 
determining success or failure of nonviolent collective action. 
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5.4. Implications for policy and proposals for practice 
 
Since cost is the determining variable in policy shifts by political elites in a non-
violent movements. Social movements espousing this strategy should adopt those 
methods that will have the potential for high long term costs both to the ruling elite and in 
the court of public opinion. Only then can they manage to divide the dominant group 
likely to be thrown off balance by this strategy through isolation. It is possible to perceive 
a nonviolent strategy that could potentially be successful for Palestinians. As the weaker 
actor, Al-Khatib et al. (2004) support the contention that Palestinians need to find a more 
effective tactic of mass resistance than force. The purpose would be to draw Israeli and 
international attention to Israeli injustices, such as the settlements and bypass roads and 
the roadblocks they engender. The protest would be confined to the territories, and no 
Israeli lives or property would be threatened. The backdrop would be a total absence of 
violent attacks against Israelis by militant Palestinian groups like Hamas and the Aqsa 
Martyrs Brigades as well as of stone throwing and Molotov cocktail attacks, which are 
potentially lethal. However, the media would have to be heavily involved in covering 
such protest. 
Infusion of violence in the course of a non-violent struggle tends to harden the 
opponents’ positions as illustrated by Israel’s public opinion on short term issues after the 
outbreak of the intifada. At the same time, it isolates potential allies from the dominant 
group who are vital in creating a necessary critical mass from within that often has 
potential to directly threaten the survival of the political elite for instance, like the 
alliance created between the nonviolent movement in South Africa and the increasingly 
moderated Afrikaner middle class so much so that delegates of the National Party’s 
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congresses in 1990 proposed  opening up the party to all races as survival of the NP 
under universal suffrage hinged on its ability to form alliances with black moderate 
political organization (Ottaway, 1993).  It is noteworthy that the Israeli response to 
Palestinian  protests in the first and even the second intifada convinced some groups 
within the Palestinian community that only the use of arms and suicide attacks to 
“balance the terror” against Palestinians would be effective in making the occupation as 
costly as possible to the Israeli public. This, however, “combined with the lack of a clear 
strategy and a clear vision to mobilize the Palestinian population in nonviolent forms of 
resistance, emboldened the Israeli government to take full advantage of the change in the 
rules of engagement for instance after September 11, 2001 and attempt to de-legitimize 
the entire Palestinian liberation movement, linking its goals with the means used to 
achieve them. The Palestinian armed resistance, labeled as "terrorism" by Israel, was 
portrayed as the goal of the Palestinian liberation movement rather than a means” (Al 
Khatib et al., 2004). This has further weakened the Palestinian case.  
In order for nonviolent methods to be effective, the movement needs to build local 
capacity of subsistence to be able to sustain methods such as strikes and boycotts for 
instance. Lacking a reasonable subsistence economy affects the ability of movements to 
sustain non-violent campaigns.  This was reflected in the Palestinian inability to sustain 
their campaign in the wake of economic restrictions. The inherent structural 
vulnerabilities left them susceptible to Israeli reprisals. Future campaigns should strive to 
establish an economic base that is fairly independent of the main state.  
One of the priorities for a nonviolent movement should be to seek alliances with 
the wider public internally and strive to sell their cause to the international public through 
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active nonviolence in order to enhance their power vis-à-vis their opponents in an often 
an asymmetrical struggle. Yet one of the limitations of the intifada was its inability to 
mobilize the international public opinion. Its nonviolent aspects were often 
overshadowed by periodic violent extremist attacks against Israeli targets. The Arab, 
Muslim, international streets as well as the Israeli peace camp must also be mobilized to 
support a nonviolent Palestinian movement. “Sustained and significant popular protests 
against Israel will eventually pressure the Israeli government to take the necessary steps 
towards peace” (Al-Khatib et al., 2004).  
Mobilizing powerful third parties although insufficient in making policy shifts in 
the target country can have significant consequences especially when the interests of the 
non-violent movement resonates with that of the general public in the target country. 
South Africa managed to win the support of significant constituencies in western 
countries who in turn pressed their governments to take action against South Africa. 
Nonviolent movements should have clear and coherent objectives, organized and 
identifiable leadership, and avoid temptations of violence by isolating violent elements 
amongst them in order to maintain their credibility. Sami Awad (as cited in Khatib et al., 
2004) suggests that a strong leadership committed to the principles of nonviolent 
resistance and community building must be established. In the Palestinian case, the initial 
focus will be on the need to unify Palestinian communities and reestablish trust between 
the leadership and the people. This should be followed by the development of a long-term 
internal strategy to build a nonviolent resistance movement on a massive scale. 
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